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ABSTRACT 
Cancer screening programmes cause harm to individuals via overdiagnosis and 
overtreatment, even where they confer population-level benefit. Screening thus appears to 
violate the principle of non-maleficence, since it entails medically unnecessary harm to 
individuals. Can consent to screening programmes negate the moral significance of this 
harm? In therapeutic medical contexts, consent is used as a means of rendering medical harm 
morally permissible. However, in this paper I argue that it is unclear that the model of 
consent used within therapeutic medicine can be applied unproblematically to preventive 
medicine. Invitation to screening changes pragmatic norms and expectations of the patient-
doctor encounter such that two key principles of consent may be violated. First, the 
pragmatics of a medical invitation are such that patients may fail to be adequately informed, 
since patients appear to assume medical invitations are made with their best interests in mind 
even where information to the contrary is outlined. Secondly, screening invitations may place 
pressure upon patients; in the context of a medical encounter, to make an invitation to 
screening constitutes an inducement to accept. In order to be sure that a patient’s consent to a 
screening invitation is valid, we must make clear to patients that their decision to accept 
screening may be shaped not only by how information about screening is presented, but by 
the pragmatic form of the invitation itself.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cancer screening is often promoted for ‘saving lives’, the implication being that all patients 
undergoing screening stand to benefit. However, even where there is aggregate benefit within 
a population, one of cancer screening’s inherent limitations is that some will benefit at the 
cost to harm to others.[1] These screening-related harms are often justified by policy-makers 
on the basis that screening programmes are effective – in other words, that they lead to a net 
reduction in morbidity and mortality.[2] Yet such a justification appears to violate the ethical 
principle of non-maleficence, since individuals are harmed by the intervention of medical 
professionals in the pursuit of a population-level benefit. In therapeutic medical contexts, 
non-maleficence is often overridden by the principle of autonomy, in the guise of consent. 
Can consent do the same moral work in preventive contexts like screening?  
In this paper, I will explore whether an appeal to consent might justify overriding non-
maleficence in cancer screening. I will first demonstrate why the principle of non-
maleficence is relevant to screening programmes, even where they provide a net benefit. 
Next, I will assess the argument that harms incurred during screening can be made morally 
irrelevant where patients have given their informed consent to participate. I will argue that 
the paradigm of consent as it applies to therapeutic medicine is not necessarily easily 
applicable to preventive medicine, since there exists a pragmatic difference between the two 
contexts. To resolve this issue, I extend Chwang’s[3] discussion of framing effects to argue 
that patients must be made aware of this pragmatic difference in order for their consent to 
screening to be valid. Where this is the case, a patient’s consent may carry sufficient moral 
weight to render permissible any harm that they incur through screening.  
For simplicity, I refer throughout to ‘doctors’ as the agents of screening. In practice, this is 
often not the case: in the UK, for example, the NHS Screening Programme makes most 
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invitations to screening programmes. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to conflate the two as 
being, in patients’ eyes, ‘medical agents’. 
1. SCREENING AND NON-MALEFICENCE  
Even where screening programmes are effective, it remains the case that a net aggregate 
benefit is compatible with harm to many specific individuals. It is worth noting here that my 
concern is with uncompensated harms. By this, I mean harms that are incurred by individuals 
who gain no benefit from screening. In other words, while an individual who is diagnosed 
with cancer through their participation in a screening programme may undergo painful cancer 
treatment, this harm is morally outweighed if the early detection of their cancer prolonged 
their life. For other individuals, however, screening leads to overdiagnosis: the detection of 
abnormalities which would never have progressed to cause harm. This results in many 
patients receiving treatment that is medically unnecessary, such as cervical excision to treat 
pre-cancerous cells which might have regressed spontaneously. Overtreatment has its own 
consequences: women undergoing cervical excision, for example, are more likely to 
experience pre-term labour.[4] 
That screening causes harm appears to violate non-maleficence, one of the core principles of 
medical ethics as outlined by Beauchamp and Childress.[5] Non-maleficence stems from the 
axiom primum non nocere – ‘first, do no harm’. Yet it is evident that medical professionals 
often do harm their patients in order to achieve some greater benefit: a surgeon may, for 
example, amputate a patient’s gangrenous leg in order to save their life. How can we 
distinguish harms which are ‘acceptable’ from those that are ‘unacceptable’? I would argue 
that we can morally justify the harm of amputating a patient’s gangrenous leg on the grounds 
that it is medically necessary to save their life, but that we cannot justify amputating both of 
their legs if amputation of only one would bring about the same benefit. In other words, harm 
is medically necessary – and thus morally acceptable – if it is the least harmful means of 
generating a greater benefit for a given patient. I therefore define non-maleficence as a prima 
facie obligation not to cause harm which is medically unnecessary. The distinction between 
medically necessary and unnecessary harm is useful in that it makes clear why we might 
deem it unacceptable for a patient’s healthy leg to be amputated in order to save another 
patient’s life. In both cases the net benefit is the same, but the latter case involves medically 
unnecessary harm.  
Imagine, though, that in order to save a patient’s life we must infect another patient with a 
cold. Perhaps the relative balance of harm and benefit in this case might lead us to believe 
that the infliction of a medically unnecessary cold is morally acceptable. However, given that 
harms of screening include unnecessary mastectomies,[6] I would suggest that the harm 
inherent in screening is more akin to leg amputation than to a cold. As a result, we cannot 
easily override non-maleficence in screening whenever there is an overall benefit, since it is 
tricky to mandate serious and medically unnecessary harm upon some individuals even where 
it brings about a net population benefit. How, then, might we resolve the issue of non-
maleficence in screening? One possible answer is to suggest that screening-related harm can 
only be justified where expected benefit to a particular individual outweighs expected harm 
to that same individual. This, however, is an impossible standard: for any particular 
individual screened, we cannot know, at the outset, whether the benefit to them outweighs the 
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harm. More than this, I would argue that we cannot know this even after screening has taken 
place, since to assess the balance of benefit and harm requires counterfactual knowledge of 
what would have happened had we not intervened. This is difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain.  
Resolving the balance of population-level beneficence and individual-level non-maleficence 
is, evidently, a tricky endeavour. Might there be an easier way to justify harm in screening? 
Although screening necessarily causes medically unnecessary harm, any given individual 
participating in screening could, in principle, benefit: screening-related harm results from 
risks imposed on an individual in order to benefit either that individual or others. In this way, 
screening can be viewed as a sort of lottery. It is much more likely that a lottery participant 
will be harmed by losing the money spent on the lottery ticket than that they will benefit by 
winning the jackpot. The potential benefit, however, is great, which may make the harm of 
wasting money seem insignificant in comparison. In buying a lottery ticket, a participant 
therefore takes on a risk which will result in benefit either to themselves or to others. If we 
are to accept that both lotteries and screening confer great benefit on at least some 
individuals, it might be argued that a rational agent may wish to accept the invitation to 
screening – despite the harms it might entail – on the basis that they stand to potentially 
benefit. If an individual wishes to accept the invitation, can their consent to the offer make 
morally irrelevant any harm they might suffer?  
2. THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT IN PREVENTIVE MEDICINE  
Let us first consider the moral status of consent as it applies to therapeutic medicine. Consent 
does moral work by ‘justifying action that would otherwise violate important norms, 
standards or expectations’.[7] Where a patient gives their consent to the amputation of their 
gangrenous leg in order to save their life, they render morally permissible an action which 
would usually violate important norms. In order for their consent to be valid, it must be both 
informed and autonomous; in other words, they must have sufficient information about the 
consequences of the action to which they gives their consent, and be free of pressuring 
influences.[1] These principles of consent – well-established in therapeutic medical contexts 
– have historically been applied unproblematically to screening. However, several authors 
have hinted at the idea that there is an ethical distinction between ‘everyday’ medical practice 
and preventive interventions such as screening.[8,9] Those who make this argument suggest 
that preventive medicine is ethically different to therapeutic medicine, although few have 
outlined exactly why. In this section, I aim to demonstrate that there is a pragmatic difference 
between the patient-initiated requests of therapeutic medicine and the doctor-initiated 
invitations of preventive medicine. This changes the ethical responsibilities which must be 
borne by the doctor, and the terms by which consent can be expected to do moral work.  
In therapeutic medicine, the patient presents to a doctor with a concern: most often, a 
symptom or set of symptoms. A patient makes a request for this concern to be addressed by 
the doctor, thereby entering into a transaction in which the ‘special social and cognitive 
authority’ of the doctor is acknowledged.[10] In screening, the transaction is different. Here, 
a doctor approaches an individual who has not sought out a medical encounter, and invites 
her to participate in screening. If we make a distinction between the contexts of patient-
initiated requests and doctor-initiated invitations, how might this lead us to conclude that 
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consent to the latter cannot meet the transactional demands of consent? Approaching healthy 
individuals with the invitation to participate in a medical intervention disrupts the normal 
framework of the therapeutic doctor-patient encounter in which a patient makes a request of 
the doctor. If, as Rebecca Kukla argues, the ‘rituals of the clinic’ are ‘essential to giving the 
transaction the pragmatic form it has’,[10] then we cannot expect the same formulation of 
consent to automatically apply in the case of preventive medicine. In the rest of this section, I 
will argue that invitations to screening present a problem on two grounds: first, that the 
pragmatics of making a medical invitation are such that a patient is liable to be misinformed; 
and second, that to make a medical invitation at all may constitute an inducement to accept.  
2.1 Informed consent 
It is well-documented that patients may be misinformed about screening – that, for example, 
they are not always clear about the risks and potential outcomes of participating in a 
screening programme.[11] This is perhaps unsurprising, given that overdiagnosis is rarely 
quantified in screening trials[12] and seldom included in patient information leaflets.[13] 
Even where risk information is provided to patients, the way in which risk is presented may 
affect the decisions patients make: for example, a patient may consent to an intervention 
which is described as conferring a 90% chance of survival, but refuse the same intervention 
when it is described as having a 10% chance of mortality. This is termed the ‘framing 
effect’.[3] A wide range of public health literature has sought to address framing effects, 
detailing tools such as decision aids and risk communication primers which explain, for 
example, that 90% survival and 10% mortality mean the same thing.[14,15] I do not dismiss 
these endeavours: it is valuable to consider how patients can be provided with the most clear 
and relevant information, and how framing effects might be minimised in order to make 
patients’ consent more morally robust. Here, though, I present a further concern: that even 
leaving aside issues of risk heuristics and communication, the pragmatic form of a medical 
invitation is such that the ‘informed’ condition of consent may be difficult to meet, even 
where we to optimise the communication of risk to patients.   
Doctors are trusted.[16] When patients make requests of their doctors to attend to their 
concerns, they assume their doctor will not suggest medical solutions which are ‘useless, 
unprofessional, too risky or illegal’.[7] The options given in response to a patient request are 
thus curtailed by normative constraints even before a patient’s consent is sought. But doctor-
invitations have a different pragmatic meaning to patient-requests. In these cases, patients 
expect – and do so reasonably – that a health professional would not invite them to participate 
in an intervention unless the health professional expected that intervention would be of 
benefit to the recipient. This may lead a patient to downplay adverse consequences of 
screening such as overdiagnosis. We can see this clearly in the case of therapeutic 
misconception, where patients invited to participate in clinical research often report benefit to 
themselves and other research subjects as the primary aim.[17] This goes beyond lack of 
disclosure of adequate information: such beliefs persist even where patients are clearly told 
that the study is not intended to benefit them but future patients, and even where they 
demonstrate an understanding of randomisation and the use of placebos.[18] In my view, 
therapeutic misconception points to a much deeper issue: patients appear to assume that 
medical invitations are made with the intention of benefitting them personally.    
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When a doctor makes an offer of screening, the pragmatic implication understood by patients 
is that this is an offer in the patient’s best interests. This is the case even where the risks of 
participation are outlined, and even where it is made clear that the programme has 
population-level rather than individual benefit. By making the invitation to screening, doctors 
are suggesting to healthy people that via their participation in the screening programme they 
will be even healthier, or live a healthy life for longer.[19] Here we can see how a 
conduit/container model of communication outlined by Manson and O’Neill – whereby 
information is transferred between agents who ‘originate’ and ‘receive’ messages – fails to 
adequately capture the complexity of the consent transaction.[7] Even where communication 
of a message is intelligible and relevant, it cannot be assumed that both parties come to share 
the same understanding. Patients expect that their doctors will behave both beneficently and 
non-maleficently towards them. As a result, they may fail to understand when doctors are 
unable to uphold these duties, even when this is clearly explained.  
2.2 Patient choice 
Let us turn to my second consideration: that invitations to screening are problematic from the 
point of view of patient choice. Kukla discusses the pragmatic implications of invitations, 
outlining how invitations ‘leave the invitee neither obligated nor with a neutral free 
choice’.[20] An individual is free to decline the invitation to screening. But an invitation – 
even where it may be declined without insult – must be welcoming: it must be delivered in 
such a way that it conveys encouragement rather than indifference. In Derrida’s words, it 
should not imply ‘if you don’t come, never mind, it doesn’t matter’.[20] Do offers of 
screening constitute ‘invitations’, in this pragmatic sense? I believe so. To take an example, 
the letter inviting women to cervical screening begins ‘the NHS offers cervical screening to 
save lives from cervical cancer’. This is hardly ‘never mind, it doesn’t matter’. GP surgeries 
are advised to add a personal message to letters on the grounds that GP endorsement 
encourages patients to accept the invitation of screening.[21,22] Even though a caveat is 
added that the decision to accept cervical screening is ‘your choice’, this is at odds with the 
pragmatic implication of the rest of the message. 
What if were to remove ‘nudges’[23], like personal messages written by the GP, from 
screening invitations? This would certainly go some way to lessening the pressure upon a 
patient to accept. However, I have a further concern. If we are to understand fully the 
pragmatic implications of an invitation, we must consider the context in which invitations are 
made, and the relationship of power between inviter and invitee. In recent decades there has 
been a concerted effort to move to a model of healthcare which emphasises a sharing of 
power between doctor and patient.[24] Nonetheless, doctors enjoy a high degree of authority 
within the medical environment;[25] as a result, in the context of a medical encounter, to 
make the invitation to screening at all constitutes at least a partial inducement to accept. It 
could be argued that the process of obtaining consent in any medical situation is necessarily 
moulded by dynamics of power and authority. But there is a distinction between patients 
making a request and doctors making an invitation. Consider the difference between 
approaching a lawyer for legal advice, and receiving a letter from a lawyer suggesting you 
bring a lawsuit. Lawyers, like doctors, occupy positions of authority. Where a patient has 
made a request of a doctor, or has sought the advice of a lawyer, she has chosen to participate 
in a transaction structured by relations of power and authority. Where a patient is invited to 
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take part in screening, or to bring a lawsuit, she has not sought out this authority, nor does she 
have a concern she wishes to be addressed. Medical authority has thus been imposed upon 
her; in such a situation, we must consider carefully whether her consent can be taken to be 
valid.  
3. IMPROVING CONSENT  
Are we to conclude that patients are irreconcilably misinformed about screening? Are 
invitations to screening always inherently coercive? Not necessarily. As I have outlined, the 
pragmatic form of an invitation to screening may mean that patients are pressured into 
accepting, or misinformed about its implications. Perhaps, though, we could see the 
pragmatic form of a screening invitation as a kind of framing effect, leading patients to 
perceive screening differently on account of how the invitation is made and who it is made 
by. How might we tackle the issue if we view it as a framing effect? Chwang[3] argues that a 
patient’s consent may be invalidated where framing effects are present, but that this consent 
can be revalidated by ‘debiasing’: alerting patients to the framing effects to which they are 
subject. Thus, rather than simply presenting patients with information (for example, that an 
intervention has 10% mortality and/or 90% survival) we can instead present meta-
information, which highlights framing effects: for example, by explaining to patients that 
they liable to make a different decision about accepting or rejecting the intervention 
depending on whether they are told that it has 10% mortality or 90% survival. We can also 
apply a similar information/meta-information distinction to my earlier example of therapeutic 
misconception. Research participants are given information: for example, ‘the aim of this 
research study is to confirm that Drug X is effective in treating cancer’. Despite this, 
participants still appear to believe that trials are conducted for their own benefit. Perhaps, 
though, therapeutic misconception could be addressed by providing meta-information: for 
example, ‘research participants may be given the impression that the research trial is intended 
to treat their illness, even though this is not its main aim’.  
The provision of meta-information is, in my view, the most compelling means to address the 
issues I have raised in this paper about the pragmatics of medical invitations. What might the 
provision of meta-information about screening look like? Screening information literature 
could make clearer the fact that many patients (reasonably) believe that an invitation to 
screening is made with their best interests in mind, even though it is inevitable that some 
individuals will be harmed by screening. Similarly, invitations to screening could stress not 
only that accepting the invitation is a patient’s choice, but also explain that patients may well 
feel pressured to take up invitations made by their doctor. Such measures would go some way 
to debiasing patients, since they highlight to patients that their consent to screening is shaped 
by the fact that they are invited to participate by doctors. If, through debiasing, we are able to 
eliminate the framing effect brought about by the pragmatic form of a medical invitation, this 
would negate my concern that such invitations may pressure or misinform patients. In turn, 
this would allow patients’ consent to screening invitations to do moral work in justifying the 
harm which patients may incur if they undergo screening.  
CONCLUSION 
Non-maleficence in screening is not a problem that can easily be cast aside, even where a 
screening programme has population-level benefit. In therapeutic medical contexts non-
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maleficence is sometimes overridden by an appeal to consent. However, it is not clear that the 
paradigm of consent as it applies to therapeutic medicine can be applied unproblematically to 
preventive medicine cases. The invitation to screening changes the pragmatic norms and 
expectations of the encounter between patient and doctor, with the result that consent may be 
unable to do the same moral work as in therapeutic encounters initiated by a patient. One 
means by which we could address this problem is through the provision of meta-information, 
which makes clear to patients how the pragmatics of a screening invitation may affect their 
decision to accept an invitation to screening. This has relevance beyond cancer screening. 
Where individual harm may result from other doctor-initiated invitations – for example, 
prenatal screening for genetic abnormalities, or cardiovascular health checks – providing 
information to patients about the risks and benefits of the intervention may be insufficient. In 
order for a patient’s consent to a doctor-initiated invitation to be valid, we must make clear to 
the patient that they are subject to framing effects. These framing effects relate not only to 
risk information, but to the pragmatic form of the invitations itself.    
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